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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action by Schocker Construction
Company (hereinafter "Schocker") on a contract for
repair and construction of a section of highway located
on Interstate 80 in Tooele County between Low and Clive.
Schocker sought recovery for damages resulting from
alleged extra work, misrepresentation, changes in the
design or character of construction, and for failure to
pay amounts due under the contract.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Trial Court found for Plaintiff on the
q u es ti on of add i ti on a l vrn r k and awarded the total sum
of $93,566.36 plus interest.

The Court found adverse

to Schocker on the question of payments withheld for
failure to meet contract specifications.

The Court

determined that Schocker's claimed extra paving costs
were to a large extent the fault of Schocker and awara:
Schocker

16~~

of its total claimed damages related to

asphalt removal and paving.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Def end ant see ks an Order of this Court affirm·
ing the judgment of the Trial Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
I

Defendant considers the statement of facts set
out in Plaintiff's Brief to be insufficient, and fortk
reason sets forth the following as a statement of fact>,
· · n of tnr
pertinent to a reasonable review of the d ec1s10

Trial Court:
1.

The Pa rt i es entered i n to a contract datea ,

August 11, 1975 for work On I -80 bet\"1een Low and Clive
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in Tooele County, to remove portions of the existing
plant mix seal (minimum of 3/4") due to excessively
rich asphalt; also for the removal of "ridges, ripples
and corrugations" and for the placement of asphalt with
a compacted depth of 2 1/2" over the entire roadway.
In those areas v1here more than 3/4" of asphalt was
removed, additional asphalt was to be placed in a
"single lift" to restore the entire planned depth of
asphalt.

(Ex. P-1
2.

&

P-2)

Said contract covers a highway section

approximately 20 miles in length with work to be done
on both east- and westbound lanes making a total of
approximately 80 lane miles.
3.

The contract is a unit price contract

with the estimated bid price being $2,182,198. (Ex. P-1)
4.

The existing surface varied considerably

as to its condition with the worst rippling and rutting
as well as saturated oil condition existing on the western
slope of the area known as Grassy Mountain.
5.

(T. 352)

The oil-rich bituminous material was removed

from the roadway surface in areas designated by the Defendant's Project Engineer.
6.

The material removed was removed by the use

o f a " h e a t e r - p l a ne r " a nd

vi a s

o p e r a t e d by L. C· Ne l s o n ,
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the owner of said equipment under a subcontract.
7.

The amount of asphalt removed was

increased by direction of Defendant's Engineer, Don
ifright, and Plaintiff was paid the unit price for all
material removed from the roadway.
8.

The depth of removal varied from 3/4"

to as much as four to six inches. (T. 246, T. 622,
Findings of Fact No. 8)
9.

The contract contained a provision re-

quiring that the asphalt be placed in a "single lift.'
(T.

245,

P.
10.

1)

Plaintiff had difficulty in complying

wi th th e " s i n g 1 e - l i f t " p r o v i s i o n , pa r t i cu l a r l y i n l rn.
(T.

246, T.

11.

387, 403)

P 1 a i n t i ff wa s a l l owed to us e a " l eve 11 inc

course" both in 1975 and 1976, but the results were

no'.

materially better 1·1hen said "levelling course" was useu
than when the material was placed in a single lift.
(T.

578-579,
12.

T.

803)

Due to surface i rregul ariti es, particular

those resulting from Plaintiff's work in 1975, thePlai
tiff used the "heater-planer" to correct said surface
i r reg u l a r it i es i n 19 7 6 a t a cl a i med cost of $15 • 0OD· (l
402-403)
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13.

The cost of removal of asphalt from

Plaintiff's subcontractor L. C. Nelson was substantially less than the unit bid price, leaving Plaintiff
v1ith an apparent profit.
14.

(Ex. P-1 and T. 439)

Plaintiff's unit price for the contract

item of bituminous surface course 3;4u maximum included
the cost of the mineral aggregate production and the
hauling, placing and compacting of the material as well.
(P. 3, Sec. 403.15)
15.

Placement of material at varying depths

would not increase the costs of producing or hauling
the material, but could increase the costs of placement and of compaction.
16.

Of the total of 80 lane miles, approxi-

mately 15 lane miles or 16.67% of the total contained
material which was removed to a depth greater than the
minimum depth specified in the contract. (T. 722 and 795)
17.

Plaintiff's testimony showed that it ih-

curred additional costs for problems associated with
the excess asphalt removal or placement of material to
varying depths in the total sum of $323,196. (Ex. P-17)
18.

The evidence at the time of trial dis-

closed that much of Plaintiff's extra costs as claimed
by Plaintiff were the result of internal problems attributable to poor planning and judgment by Plaintiff or were
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associated ~1ith weather problems, most of which viere
not the fault of Defendant.

(D-87, D-89, T. 380,

387, 414-427, 548, 582, 617, 620-622, 726-730, 744783, 803)
19.

The Trial Court after considering the

evidence determined that Plaintiff was entitled to 16'.
of its claimed total amount of extra costs amounting
to the sum of $51,711.36.

(Findings of Fact No. 9anc

10)
20.

The Trial Court found that Plaintiff

was entitled to an award of extra costs for the paving·
of approaches and ramp roads not shown on the plans bo:,
for bituminous surface course and seal coat and deter·
mined said amount to be $41,855.
No.

(Findings of Fact

22 and Conclusions of Law No. 1)
21.

The Plaintiff is appealing only that por-

tion of the Trial Court's award based on alleged extra
c o s ts as s o c i a t e d 1v i th p av i n g i n a re a s of v a r y i ng de Pth
The Defendant elected not to appeal the judgment of the
Court.
22.

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend the

Findinas of Facts, Conclusions of Law and For Recon·
sideration and argue d th e same theory ad vanced in its
brief on appeal to the Trial Judge.

The Trial Judge
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I

denied Plaintiff's Motion after hearing argument.
(T. 227 and 231)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES TO
PLAINTIFF FOR EXCESSIVE COSTS OF PLACING
ASPHALT IS PROPER.
There was considerable conflict in the testimany before the Trial Court as to the amount of damage
allegedly sustained by the Plaintiff for work associated
with removing an existing asphalt surface and replacing
same to the preexisting level and then overlaying the
entire surface with an additional layer of asphalt.
Plaintiff calculated its damages based on a "total cost
theory'' of damages which theory Defendant objected to.
Plaintiff asserts its damages amount to the sum of
$323,196.

(Ex. P-17)

The evidence before the Court

shows that Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a supplemental agreement in late 1975 to increase the estimated quantity of the bid item for removal of

bitu~inous

materia1 by 10,000 tons at the same unit price.

The

actual removal was performed by a subcontractor.
The Standard Specifications provide that in
the placement of bituminous asphalt that if the depth
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of placement exceeds four inches it shall be done
in two lifts.

(P . 3 S ec. 303 . 09)

Th ere was a con-

flict in the testimony as to whether the Plaintiff
in fact was allowed to use more than one lift in 1975 .
The Defendant's Engineer who was on the proJ·ect every
day said they were allowed to do so.

(T. 798)

The

Plaintiff asserted it ~1as only permitted to lay a
"skin patch" which the Plaintiff's witnesses argued
did not constitute a "levelling course."
contended that

~1ithout

Plaintiff

being allowed to lay a "level-

ling course" it could not achieve specification compliance.
In analyzing the evidence before the Court
related to the damages claimed by Plaintiff it is
obvious that the Trial Court discounted Plaintiff's
damage claims as exaggerated.

The Plaintiff was

adequately compensated for the actual removal of the
existing asphalt as is evident from its acceptance of
the work order increasing the quantity at the same
unit price after operations ceased in 1975.

(Ex. 0-9)

The unit price for "bituminous surface
course" would only be affected by the increased depth
of rem ova 1 i n two po s s i b 1 e are as ; the cos t of P1acing
the material and the cost of compacting the material.
The other costs involved,

1~hich are the production of
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the mineral aggregate, and the mixing and hauling
were obviously not adversely affected by the increased
amount needed to replace the excavated material since
costs associated with these operations are relatively
fixed.
Plaintiff knew of the increase in quantity
of the bituminous surface course item in time to crush
the additional aggregate.

The increased quantity should

have resulted in a benefit to the Plaintiff since the
mobilization cost of its crushing equipment would have
already been recovered in the planned quantity and its
production costs reduced accordingly.
The Defendant through at least five different
witnesses established that most of the difficulty the
Plaintiff encountered, particularly in 1975, was the
result of mismanagement, incompetence, adverse weather
and other factors not the fault of Defendant.
D. 87 & 89)

(Exs.

It was further evident from the testimony

that Defendant through its employees, notably Bob
Charlesworth, assisted Plaintiff in working out internal problems during 1976.

(T. 578, 579, 803)

It was also apparent that Defendant's actions
in 1975 were an attempt to require the Plaintiff to comply with the contract requirements,

(T. 264, 459)

It

was further apparent that Defendant allowed modifications
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to the contract which were of substantial benefit
to the Plaintiff.

(T. 793, 794, 799)

The Court therefore rejected the Plaintiff's
claims as to the amount of its damages and chose, on
the basis of substantial evidence in the record, to
award the Plaintiff damages based on a percentage of
the amount claimed by Plaintiff,
In the case of Even Odds, Inc. v. Nielson,
22 U.2d 49, 448 P.2d 709 (1968), this Court said the
following regarding the method adopted by the Trial
Court in that case to assess damages as follows:
. . . Speaking generally about
damages, the desired objective is to
evaluate any loss suffered by the most
direct, practical and accurate method
that can be employed.

We have no disagreement with the proposition that the fact-trier should not
be permitted to arbitrarily ignore, competent, credible and uncontradicted evidence. Nevertheless, he is not bound
to slavishly follow the evidence and the
figures given by any particu~ar.wit~ess.
Within the limits of reason it is his
prerogative to place his own apprai~al
upon the evidence which impress~s him
as credible and to draw conclusions
therefrom in accordance with his own
best judgment. (Citations omitted)
In the case of Gardner v. The Calvert, 25 3 f.
395,

3~09

,

t

h e Court speaking about the amount of damac

to be a 1v a rd e d after the fact of l o s s i s est ab l is hed ,\
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the Court can estimate the amount of damages:
. . . from the facts in evidence
including the inferences to be drawn '
from them, and the probabilities which
they suggest.
It is respectfully submitted that the Court
has adopted a practical method of determining the damages which Plaintiff is entitled to for costs associated
with paving portions of the roadway in areas where the
excavation varied more than could reasonably have been
anticipated by the Plaintiff at the time of bidding.
Plaintiff in its brief apparently misconstrues
the meaning and intent of the Court's conclusion regarding damages to be awarded for the "overrun in bituminous
surface course including specifically those alleged problems involved with excessive removal of existing asphalt,"
as set forth in Conclusion of Law No. 2.

Plaintiff also

apparently forgot that Exhibit P-17 was the subject of
considerable interest to the Trial Court and prompted
several questions by the Trial Judge of Plaintiff's
principal witness, Robert Schocker.

(See T. 320 to 323)

In the interchange between the Court and Mr. Schocker,
the following took place beginning at the bottom of page
320 of the trial transcript:
Schocker: Okay, the $323,196 is
based on the time it took to pave the
project. In other words, we added up
all our equipment costs and got so many
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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hours, and so many dollars, and overrun
from what we bid of $323,196.00.
The Court:

Allright.

Schocker:

Then you want me to contini:

down?

The Court: No, your counsel will 00 •
from now.
I didn't know what you meant by:t
word, I realize in your business, your trade
~here are some terms that have a meaning ana'
Just v1asn 1 t sure what you meant by overrun.
Ju s t s hows the surface cost you $ 3 2 3 , 19 6. oo
more than you bid.
Sc hocker:

You are right, Your Honor.

Schocker later recounts how Plaintiff's cost<
were totaled and the payment received from the State
deducted to arrive at the above figure.
It is clear, therefore, that the Court basea
the testimony of Bob Schocker understood the amount 1i
on Exhibit P-17 of $323,196.00 to be Schocker's claime
extra costs for the bituminous surface course "overrun
on the total project and not just that amount require(
the excess removal area as now asserted by Plaintiff:
its brief.
The justification for extra compensation over
the contract amount is to be found in the Standard Spt
fications, Section 104.02(4).

(Ex. P-3)

The Specifii

tion allows a supplemental agreement to cover
in plan or in the character of construction."

a "chanc'
The oe"
I

dant objected to any allowance on the basis that Plair:
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had not served notice of its claim in writing until
after the fact.

The Court in its Conclusion of Law

No. 2 concluded that Plaintiff was excused from this
procedural requirement, which point the Defendant
concedes.

The Court concluded that removal of asphalt

to excess depths on 16% of the roadway was to be recognized as either a "change of plan" or a "change in the
character of construction."
The testimony, apparently believed by the
Court, tended to show that while the excess removal
created problems for the Plaintiff it was by no means
the only problem, and the Court apparently elected to
use a percentage factor multiplied against Plaintiff's
total claimed costs to arrive at an amount of damages
to be awarded for the "overrun" claimed by Plaintiff.
The Trial Court clearly understood what it
was doing in calculating damages due Plaintiff, and the
assertion by Plaintiff that the Trial Court "simply miscalculated Schocker's damages" is simply not true.

This

is further obvious since the Plaintiff's assertion is
essentially the same argument advanced in its Motion to
Amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and For
Reconsideration, which Motion the Trial Court heard and
denied.

-13-
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POINT II
SCHOCKER IS NOT ENTITLED TO A
GUARANTEED PROFIT.
Schocker's contention that "because of its
additional costs incurred by Schocker it lost its
expected profit of $120,119.00" and is entitled now
to recover it, is to say the least a novel approach.
The fallacy of this argument is certainly obvious.
To have any hope of recovery, the Plaintiff
would have to prove that its profit projection in its
bi d

~1 as

re as on ab 1 e and th a t i t wo u 1 d have i n fact made

such a profit.

Secondly, Plaintiff would have to show

that none of its additional costs were in any 11ay the
fa u 1 t of P l a i n t i ff o r we re a t t r i bu ta b 1e t o the actions
of Plaintiff.

Defendant does not question that Plain·

tiff's "contract rate" of 5.94% profit is a reasonable
percentage of profit which a contractor would hope to
recover, but there is certainly insufficient evidence
before the Court to establish that Plaintiff has ever
in fact earned such a profit or that Plaintiff could
have done so in this case.

The evidence further fails

to establish that Plaintiff did not create most of the
problems it encountered.
. th Plaintiff'
There is an additiona l pro bl em W,

claim, and that is the fact that Plaintiff's witness
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-14-

Robert Schocker admitted that Plaintiff's bid on the
item of "bituminous surface course" is "unbalanced."
(T. 322)

This means the actual bid item unit price

is reduced from the amount the Plaintiff determined
the bid for that item should be, and the amount of the
reduction is then placed in another bid item.

We do

not know the amount by which the item was reduced
nor where that amount was placed in the bidding
schedule.

It is thus obvious that with the evidence

before the Court an additional award to Plaintiff for
"profit" on the "bituminous surface course" bid item
might result in a windfall to the Plaintiff.
Schocker has cited the case of Whitmeyer Bros.
Inc. v. State, 406 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1978} as authority for
recovery of profit.

The decision in that case is proper

since the Court under the fact situation therein decided
to award the full amount of the plaintiff's claimed
extra costs and the "overhead and profit" would properly
apply to the full amount as an additional element of cost.
In this case, the Trial Judge was aware of what the figures on Exhibit P-17 represented.

The question of profit

and how it was to be handled was discussed in the trial.
(T. 319, 330-335)

The Trial Judge knew exactly what he

was doing, and his fuilure to add an additional sum for
profit to the amount awarded the Plaintiff is intentional.
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q

This contention was again argued to the Trial Judge

-

in Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, Con.
clusions of Law, Judoment and For Reconsideration and
denied by the Court.
In the case of Sornsin Construction Co. v.
State of Montana, 590 P.2d 125 (1978), also cited by
Plaintiff in its brief, the Court again determined
that the Plaintiff's actual costs were "presumed to
be reasonable" and that the State failed in proving
the costs were unreasonable.

In this case, there

was an abundance of proof to show that plaintiff's
costs were "unreasonable" and that they did not relate
solely to work associated with the excess thickness
but that they also related to the cost of paving gen·
erally.

(Exhibits D. 87 and D. 89, T. 414, 415, 41),

420, 427, 548, 620, 645, 726-730, 775, 777-783.)
The Court quite properly rejected the claim of Plaintiff regarding profit.

Since the Court opted to awar~

Plaintiff less than the amount claimed and was fully
cognizant of Plaintiff's claimed costs including prof!:
the award of damages by the Trial Court in a lesser
amount obviously include profit as an element of those
damages as determined by the Court.
Plaintiff also cited the case of~
J)3

Ca 11 a h a n \J a 1 k e r Co n s t . Co . , 3 l 7 U. S . 5 6 , 6 3 S · Ct ·
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(1942).

This case does not apply, however, for the

reason that it involves different contractual provisions involving "changes" or "disputes" which are
not included in the contract between the parties to
this litigation.

As a point of information, the

ruling of the Supreme Court in said case resulted in
a denial of recovery by the Plaintiff.

The Defendant

does not dispute that the Trial Court could have awarded
additional damages consisting of "profit," but the Court
failed to do so with full knowledge that Plaintiff
claimed to be entitled to same.
In any event, there is substantial evidence
in the record to support the Trial Court in awarding
less than the amount sought by Plaintiff.

There is

equally as much evidence in the record to support
the Court in not awarding an additional element of
damage for Plaintiff's claimed profit.

The Plaintiff

simply failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that it earned a profit or could have done
so in the absence of the claimed extra paving effort
by the Plaintiff.

In fact, the Court specifically

concluded in Conclusion of Law No. 5 "that Plaintiff
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
it was entitled to recover damages other than those
specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 of these Conclusions
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of Law."

lParagraph 1 dealt with the ramps and

approaches and paragraph 2 allowed recovery for
16% of Plaintiff's claimed costs associated with

excessive removal of asphalt.)

The Court then went

on to find and conclude in said paragraph 5 that:
The Court further finds that
damages alleged by Plaintiff under its
total cost approach were not the fault
of the State but were the result of such
things as problems in the setting up and
internal operations of Plaintiff's plant
and improper equipment or were associated
with the weather or other factors not the
responsibility of Defendant.
Finally, the Court concluded in Conclusion
of Law No. 6 that Plaintiff was "not entitled to its
claim for profit as set forth in its exhibits since
profit, if any, is a part of the unit cost of individual items set forth in the contract."
Certainly no contractor who operates under
the competitive bid process is entitled to a guaranteo
profit.

If a contractor encounters conditions in the

performance of a contract which are other than those
presented in the pl ans and specifications, and if the
contractor fol lows the procedural requirements of noti
sic·
to the contracting agency and follows procedures de,

to properly account for the extra effort, then the coi·
· 1 e d t o re l 1e
· f.
tractor is ent1t

Under the situation

lined, the contractor should recover his "reasonable
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°1

cos ts" of performing the extra work.

If on the other

hand the contractor is already in a situation where
the contractor is losing money in performance of the
contract due to internal problems such as inefficiency,
incompetence, lack of diligent prosecution or other
factors not the fault of the contracting agency, then
the contractor must stand the loss without expecting
the contracting agency to indemnify that loss.

If in

the latter situation, the contractor encounters conditions which were not as represented, then the contractor
is entitled to recover those additional "reasonable costs"
but not those costs attributable to the contractor's own
internal problems.

To compensate a contractor for all

costs incurred without distinguishing between the source
of the fault does violence to the theory of competetive
bidding.

Defendant respectfully submits that the Trial

Court has distinguished between those costs Plaintiff
incurred as a result of internal problems and those
resulting from unforeseen circumstances and has compensated Plaintiff for its "reasonable costs" (including profit thereon) of performing extra work.
CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully submits that the judgment of the Trial Court is amply sustained by the record.
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The Court adopted a reasonable and practical method
of awarding Plaintiff recovery for work items not
shown on the plans.

The ramps and approach road

cost Plaintiff additional amounts to complete, and
the Court accepted Plaintiff's evidence fully on
these items.

The Court because of the conflict in

the evidence chose not

to accept Plaintiff's evidenc:

on the excess paving costs.

The Court greatly dis-

counted Plaintiff's evidence and elected to compensat 0
P l a i n t i ff o n th e b as i s o f a per c en ta g e o f the cl aimed
amount.

Finally, the Court specifically rejected

P l a i n t i ff ' s c l a i med p r o f i t am o u n t s .

Th e e v i den ce sup·

ports the Court in this determination.

The record

discloses that Plaintiff's own internal operations
were the cause of most of Plaintiff's inefficiency
and failure to earn a profit.

Obviously, the public

should not indemnify Plaintiff for its own inefficient,
Defendant respectfully requests that this
Court sustain the decision of the Trial Court.

Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General

. . -~~;-~ <r-1
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~· / - · [./;o;.,, / / . , . ~-: :·t_L..-L,E LAND D. FORD
nerO
Assistant Attorney Ged ,
Attorney for Respon en,
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